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Introduction
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“In the fiction of the future”, writes Raymond Federman in the 1970s, “the distinction between 
the real and the imaginary, between the conscious and the subconscious, between the past and 
the present, between truth and untruth will be abolished” (Federman, 1981, p. 8). In the late 
1990s, Marie-Laure Ryan spoke of a similar “crisis” whereby fiction dominated to the extent that 
non-fiction seemed less real. Certainly, in today’s post-millennial and so-called “post-truth” age, 
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the boundary between reality and fiction seems increasingly hard to distinguish: politicians spin 
stories; everyday reality in (social) media is invested in live narratives; historical events are 
narrativized in literary texts; fantasy as a genre is more popular than ever; and new genres – such 
as autofiction and fanfiction – blur the boundaries between autobiography and artistic creation on 
the one hand and referentiality and readerly reception on the other. This post-truth sensibility 
reaches beyond the intentions of creators and beyond the fabric of texts, impacting the way 
people live their everyday lives together with and inspired by the stories that surround them. For 
all these reasons, stories as tools for making sense of human action in situated social realities are 
today more important than ever. Stories are, for example, one of the primary vehicles through 
which politics is articulated and debated (Andrews, 2014). In a study on a large, public 
deliberative forum, Polletta and Lee (2006) suggest that those who identify with minority 
opinions, prefer using personal stories as part of their argumentation, and so tend to get a more 
favorable response from those who have a different opinion. Moreover, the spread of new media 
affects the affordances and constraints available in interaction and interpersonal sense-making. 
These new media narrative forms and the hybrid ontologies of post-truth modes of storytelling in 
the twenty-first century make fictionality a more pressing critical concern. Stylistic and 
narratological tools and models must keep pace with the complexities of these narratives in order 
to remain relevant and to adequately elucidate their formal properties, the interpretive processes 
they involve, and the experiential effects they generate. 
This special issue explores the theoretical and methodological consequences of post-truth 
modes of storytelling across a range of cultural contexts and narrative forms. In this introduction, 
we contextualise the contemporary post-truth zeitgeist with respect to previous narratological 
research and specifically link it to recent developments in the study of fictionality. The next 
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section provides an overview of ‘post-truth’ – its intellectual and journalistic origins and the 
political, social and cultural conditions the term designates. We then provide a historical outline 
of Fictionality Studies from the 1970s to the present before summarizing current debates around 
the distinction between fictionality and factuality and considering hybrid forms, such as refer-
fictionality and cross-fictionality. Finally, we introduce the articles in this special issue. 
 
 
A contemporary culture of post-truth 
 
The term post-truth originates in Keyes’ (2004) The Post-Truth Era: Dishonesty and Deception 
in Contemporary Life. Keyes argued that American culture was becoming less predisposed to 
value truth. Spurred on by President Trump’s electoral campaign and subsequent period in 
office, or political events such as Britain’s vote to leave the European Union – both of which 
featured outlandish, truth-defying claims – several journalists have since published book-length 
accounts of the post-truth condition (Ball, 2017; D’Ancona, 2017; Davis, 2017; and McIntyre 
2018), and academic research has emerged from a diversity of disciplines, including 
anthropology (Mair, 2017), communication studies (Hannan, 2018; Harsin, 2015, 2018), 
philosophy (Tallis, 2016), cognitive psychology (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017; Munoz, 
2017), politics (Fish, 2016) and stylistics (Browse, 2017, in press). As Browse (in press) notes, 
both academic and journalistic discourses on post-truth tend to converge on two broad claims: 
(1) that there is some change in contemporary cultures of reception that means audiences no 
longer invest traditional brokers of the “truth” with authority (for example, scientists and other 
forms of expert, journalists and traditional media organisations, ‘mainstream’ politicians and 
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political institutions); (2) that there has been a change in the journalistic or political practices of 
discourse production such that a rhetorical premium is no longer placed on “the truth”, but the 
identity and emotions of the speaker. Some have suggested that these latter changes reflect a 
broader ‘metamodern’ cultural reconfiguration that is also expressed in literary and artistic 
production (see van den Akker, Gibbons, & Vermeulen, 2017). 
Insofar as the first claim is concerned, a now familiar refrain is that a central cause of the 
declining authority of traditional institutions is the internet. Social media websites are governed 
by an “attention economy” predicated on predictive analytics (Harsin, 2015, p. 330). The 
algorithms which select the information with which we are presented create “filter bubbles” that 
link users to content which is similar to what we, or our “friends”, have already read or shared 
(Pariser, 2011). This creates a self-reinforcing loop – an “echo chamber” – in which we are 
repeatedly provided with perspectives which confirm our own (cf. Lewandowsky et al., 2017). 
The effect is to couple our access and exposure to information with our online identities, 
enmeshing our conception of reality with our conception of ourselves and the social groups to 
which we belong. Some scholars have questioned the extent to which filter bubbles do in fact 
shape our beliefs and attitudes (Flaxman, Sharad, & Rao, 2016; Kelly Garrett, 2009; Prior, 
2013). Others have asked whether the word ‘post-truth’ is “simply a rallying point for the 
outraged intelligentsia, one that describes nothing more than their chagrin at the fact that the 
wrong kinds of people are suddenly claiming authority and having their say?” (Mair, 2017, p. 3) 
Browse (in press) suggests that the trends in reception, identified by ‘post-truth’, are 
symptomatic of a broader crisis of legitimacy in establishment institutions – a crisis brought on 
by a failure to adequately deal with and explain economic stagnation and crashing living 
standards: “it is not, then, that audiences have ceased to care about the truth, but that official 
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truths have ceased to match lived realities” (Browse, in press). Whatever the causes, it is clear 
that there has been a shift in the manner that audiences convey legitimacy and authority upon 
sources of news and information. Similarly, the rise of hybrid literary genres, their reception, and 
the interactive and trans-medial quality of contemporary narrative forms all suggest a popular 
rebalancing of power and prestige from authors to readers and audiences. 
The second claim of the discourse on post-truth culture focuses on a change in the 
rhetorical practices of public figures. The political activist, Naomi Klein (2017, pp. 55–56) notes 
that lying, or the production of “alternative facts”, has become a regular feature of recent 
Whitehouse communications. In another English-speaking context, the “leave” campaign in 
Britain’s recent referendum on membership of the European Union infamously claimed that were 
the UK to withdraw, it would free £350 million for investment in the National Health Service – 
money that has yet to be found, let alone committed to this end. While distortions of the truth – 
or sometimes outright lies – have long been a feature of political and media discourse, today’s 
tumultuous political context has engendered a shift in the kinds of rhetorical arguments made by 
politicians. The trend has been noted in popular culture; in the 2005 pilot of his show, The 
Colbert Report, Stephen Colbert used the term ‘truthiness’ to criticise the then US President, 
George W. Bush Jnr., for his reliance on gut feeling. In his subsequent roast of the President at 
the 2006 Whitehouse Correspondents’ dinner, Colbert joked: 
 
Do you know that you have more nerve endings in your gut than you have in your head? 
You can look it up. And now some of you are going to say: I did look it up and that’s not 
true. That’s because you looked it up in a book. Next time look it up in your gut. My gut 
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tells me that’s how our nervous system works […] I give people the truth unfiltered by 
rational arguments (Colbert, 2006). 
 
The comedian thus identifies a particular rhetorical strategy. The speaker’s cache as an authentic, 
gutsy and plain-speaking person is leveraged to warrant an assertion; what matters is less the 
veracity of the proposition but the extent to which – and the vigour with which – it is believed. 
Truthiness thus ‘abandons the reality of truth as a legitimate register of signification’ 
(Vermeulen, 2015). This echoes the online culture of reception identified above, which fuses 
issues of truth and reliability with identity and social belonging; the speaker “speaks their truth”. 
We argue this reflects a more general cultural preoccupation with personal ethos and affect, 
manifested in the contemporary rupture of fictionality. Writers and readers collapse or 
foreground the distinctions between authors, narrators and characters not because they do not 
matter, but because the interplay of these identities is a source of personal involvement and 
ethical attachment. 
‘Truthiness’ involves the performance of a local truth-for-the-speaker. Conversely, Roscoe 
and Hight (2001) analyze mock documentaries, arguing that they use strategies that impress upon 
their subject matter the status of fact, or rather perform ‘factuality’. They point to a factual 
aesthetic which attempts ‘to create a position for audiences in which we are encouraged to take 
up unproblematically the truth claims offered to us’ (Roscoe & Hight, 2001, p. 23). The 
rhetorical claim travels in the opposite direction to truthiness – rather than abandon reality, the 
performance of factuality is a claim to accurately represent it. In the case of mock-documentary, 
Roscoe and Hight suggest this appropriation of factuality strategies can be parodic, critical, or 
used reflexively to deconstruct documentary. Factuality and truthiness strategies can also be 
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combined. The British Labour Party has issued two documentary-style party political broadcasts 
– a 1987 documentary about the then leader, Neil Kinnock, dubbed “Kinnock the movie” by its 
critics (Browse, 2017), and a 1997 broadcast which featured fly on the wall footage of, and 
biographical interviews with, the former leader and Prime Minister, Tony Blair (Browse, 2017; 
Pearce, 2001). In these contexts, the performance of unmediated access to the ‘real lives’ of 
political actors functions as a tacit appeal to their ethos and the public construction of their 
‘normalness’ (Fairclough, 2000, p. 99). The rhetorical construction of factuality in these political 
documentaries is thus closely linked to the politicians’ projected authenticity as public figures 
and the ‘truthiness’ of their rhetorical performances. 
This combined documentary-style and ‘truthy’ rhetorical strategy prefigures the political 
rise of Donald Trump. Before becoming the President, Trump was the star and executive 
producer of the US version of The Apprentice, a reality television show. Some journalists have 
pointed to continuities between the Trump administration’s handling of political affairs and 
entertainment: the ‘presidency is being produced like a reality television show’ (Klein, 2017, p. 
57). Indeed, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich, said of the 
President’s inauguration that he “is going to be the executive producer of a thing called the 
American government. He’s going to have a huge TV show called ‘Leading the World’” (as 
cited in Klein, 2017, pp. 53–54). 
The contemporary political, social and cultural context has therefore produced a 
proliferation of different “regimes of truth” (Foucault, 1984) – new reality brokers, new ways of 
styling truth claims and new attitudes towards fiction. Narratologists are well placed to navigate 
this post-truth context in which ontological and ethical questions have been assigned a special 
cultural and political salience. In the following section we outline what we see as a key heuristic 
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for investigating these issues and which forms the touchstone of the contributions to this special 
issue: the concept of fictionality. 
 
 
A Brief History of Fictionality from within Narrative Studies: From 1970s-2000 
 
Fictionality is not originally a narratological question. As Dawson (2015, pp. 74–75) highlights, 
fictionality first emerged as a scholastic concern in its own right in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Schaeffer (2012) identifies three “major competing definitions” of fictionality that develop from 
this period: semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic (cf. Gorman, 2005; Zetterberg Gjerlevsen, 
2016b). Rather than being an approach to literature per se, semantic approaches are grounded in 
analytic philosophy and logic, and focus their attention on the truth value of the subject matter 
(cf. Lewis, 1983; Harshaw, 1984; Prince, 1991). Related to this are accounts that utilise Possible 
Worlds Theory (Pavel, 1975, 1986; Ryan, 1980, 1985, 1991; Ronen, 1994; Doležel, 1998), and 
are still current in narratology today (Bell, 2019). 
Syntactic approaches to fictionality prioritize linguistic and stylistic features that mark 
texts out as fictional. Hamburger’s (1973) The Logic of Literature is a foundational text here. 
Although some of her arguments have been subsequently seen as outlandish – for instance, her 
insistence on narratorless or third-person narration, and her dissent against first-person narration 
(Hamburger, 1973, pp. 55–89) – it set an agenda for considering stylistics aspects (particularly 
narrative pronouns, and spatial and temporal deixis) that are (supposedly) markers of fictionality. 
Banfield (1982) is also centrally concerned with deictic markers, analysing these as part of what 
she calls a “grammatical account of narrative style” (p. 17). Her central focus is speech and 
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thought presentation, primarily free indirect discourse. She ultimately argues that there is 
“something essential to fiction in its representation of consciousness” (Banfield, 1982, p. 260). 
The relationship between two minds, one representing and the other represented in the text, that 
is narrator and character or the narrating-I and the experiencing-I, has been the target of narrative 
analysis at least for about 100 years (see Lubbock, 1921; Watt, 2001; Booth, 1983; Cohn, 1978). 
More recently, Herman (2011) offers an inclusive outline of consciousness representation in 
English language narratives and of the latest debates on possible differences and convergences 
between the interpretation and study of minds in and outside of fiction. Nevertheless, syntactic 
approaches have been criticized as essentialist (Schaeffer, 2012). 
In strong opposition to syntactic categorisations of fictionality, pragmatic approaches are 
founded on Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1975). In ‘The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse’, 
Searle (1975) rejects syntactic theories outright: “there is no trait or set of traits which all works 
of literature have in common and which could constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for being a work of literature” (p. 320). Instead, he casts fictionality as a speech act characterized 
by pretense: fiction is defined based on the “illocutionary stance that the author takes toward it, 
and that stance is a matter of complex illocutionary intentions that the author has when he writes 
or otherwise composes it” (Searle, 1975, p. 325). In turn, the conventions of fiction-making that 
surround the speech-act enable readers to recognize it as such. Currie (1990) subsequently 
substituted the concept of the fictive in place of pretense. Bruss (1976) takes a similar speech-act 
approach, considering the illocutionary force governing autobiographical speech-acts. She 
identifies three rules underlying the factuality of autobiography: the autobiographical author both 
created the text and shares identity with a character; the reported events are underwritten by a 
truth-claim (e.g., they actually happened); the autobiographical author believes in the veracity of 
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their narrative (Bruss, 1976, p. 10–11). In the 1990s, Lamarque and Olsen (1994) published 
Truth, Fiction, and Literature which Gorman (2005) considered to be “the most detailed 
formulation of a pragmatic account yet offered” (p. 165). Lamarque and Olsen (1994, p. 1) 
defend a no-truth theory of literature: truth or knowledge do not concern literature, which rather 
explores and develops great themes of life such as moral dilemmas, emotions and an individual’s 
relation to society. This is to say that even though literature sometimes appears to offer 
propositions about life, the assessment of these propositions or debate about their truth-value is 
not part of literary criticism (Lamarque & Olsen, 1994, pp. 332–334). Still, literature has a deep 
connection with life. Using analytical philosophy, Lamarque and Olsen discuss fictionality, 
mimesis and cognitive value in their effort to understand literature as a distinctive cultural 
practice that explores matters of human interest. 
The late 1980s and the 1990s saw the publication of several landmark works which 
continued the syntactic school of thought. Critics such as Lejeune, Genette, and Cohn offer a 
formalist or what Fludernik (2018, p. 71) following Klauk and Köppe (2014) calls a “text-
focused” approach. Philippe Lejeune (1989), for instance, outlined what he saw as the stylistic 
features of autobiography and claimed that the combination of the style and fictionality of a work 
put in place different ‘pacts’ between writers: autobiographical and fictional as well as 
phantasmatic – a pact which has since been applied to autofiction (for instance, see Gibbons, 
2018). In ‘Signposts of Fictionality’, Cohn (1990) similarly identifies ‘signposts’ that make a 
piece of work fiction, focusing on three criteria: narrative levels (story and discourse), narrative 
situations (voice, mode, and point of view), and narrative agents (authors and narrators). Nearly a 
decade later, in The Distinction of Fiction, Cohn (1999, p. 110) moved towards a stricter division 
between fictional and non-fictional narrative realms and argued for the usefulness of a clear 
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separation of the two whilst still arguing that borderline cases are those that are most helpful in 
crafting any distinctions. Genette (1993, p. 82) in Fiction & Diction  also argues against any pure 
forms. Moreover, he saw narratology that only analyzes fictional texts as restricted narratology. 
For both Genette (1993, pp. 69–78) and Cohn (1999, pp. 123–131), the most important feature 
separating historiography from fiction is the author-narrator-relation: in historiography the two 
are the same, in fiction they are separate. They also pinpoint free indirect discourse as the 
narrative mode most characteristic of fiction (Genette, 1993, p. 63; Cohn, 1999, p. 26; see also 
McHale, 1978, p. 282) – a view later disputed through findings of FID in natural language such 
as journalistic writing (Fludernik, 1993, p. 92–94; Frus, 1994, p. 24). More generally Genette 
(1993, p. 66–67) argues that the thoughts of a real person can only be cited in historical 
narratives based on documentary evidence; psychological portrayal must rely on clear 
documentation or be explicitly offered as speculative and conditional. It is important to notice 
here that Cohn and Genette were mostly concerned with historical and to some extent also 
(auto)biographical texts in comparison to literary fiction; therefore, their scope of study differs 
greatly from today’s discussions of fictionality, where everyday discourse, such as political 
speeches are studied alongside fictional narratives. 
A performative approach to fictionality stems from Walton’s (1990) thinking in Mimesis as 
Make-Believe  wherein he discusses a range of text-types, including children’s play alongside 
various representational arts (literature, visual art). Ryan (2006) credits Walton as putting “the 
theory of fictionality on the transmedial track” (p. 35), a strand of fictionality discussed further 
below. Walton’s (1990) central tenet was that representations should be “understood as things 
with the function of serving as props in games of make-believe” (p. 105). Alexander Bareis and 
Lene Nordrum’s (2015) edited book How to Make Believe: The Fictional Truths of the 
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Representational Arts studies different types of representations from novels to photographs, 
digital games, TV series and memoirs covering literature, visual arts, performative arts and 
games. Adopting a philosophical approach to fictionality as make-believe across a wide array of 
representational art, the book looks for similarities and differences between art forms in their 
ways to generate fictional truths. 
Finally, Wolfgang Iser’s (1993) The Fictive and the Imaginary draws on literary 
anthropology and is affiliated with reader response criticism (Tompkins, 1980). Iser (1993) finds 
that treating fiction and reality as binary opposites is problematic and moves to “replace this 
duality with a triad: the real, the fictive, and what we shall henceforth call the imaginary” (p. 1). 
He proposes three “fictionalising acts”: selection of social, historical, cultural and literary 
parameters; combination of linguistic and semantic features in composition; and self-disclosure, 
in self-reflexive foregrounding of fictionality. Through his focus on textuality and imaginative 
construction, Iser’s work is reception-oriented and stands as a significant precursor of recent 
attempts to develop a cognitive account of fictionality (Gibbons, 2014; Kukkonen & Nielsen, 
2018). 
 
 
Fictionality Studies in the Twenty-First Century 
 
In the twenty-first century, the study of fictionality has become, once again, topical among 
scholars of narrative. The rhetorical approach, which stems from the pragmatic tradition, has 
amassed significant support. In ‘The Pragmatics of Narrative Fictionality’, Walsh (2005) rebukes 
semantic, syntactic, and performative approaches to fictionality, offering his own pragmatic 
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account using relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986). This chapter was subsequently 
republished as the opening to his influential monograph The Rhetoric of Fictionality (Walsh, 
2007). The rhetorical trend has been continued more recently by Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh 
(2015), Phelan (2017), and Zetterberg Gjerlevsen (2016a, 2017, 2018). Nielsen is also committed 
to this approach, though he spreads his allegiances between rhetorical and unnatural narratology 
(2010, 2011; Kukkonen & Nielsen, 2018). The rhetorical approach sees fictionality as “the 
intentional use of invented stories and scenarios” (Nielsen et al., 2015, p. 62), a definition that 
rests on the intention (the intentional use) of the sender in communication. The rhetorical 
approach of the 2000s has metamorphosized from strictly pragmatic predecessors by taking a 
more flexible stance on text-based markers. While Phelan and Nielsen (2017) clarify that the 
rhetorical approach does not believe that there are “one-to-one correspondences” between textual 
techniques, narrativity, and fictionality (p. 83), there is general consensus that markers can 
prompt contextual assumptions of fictionality, though through recourse to authorial intention. 
This inclusion of contextuality was previously advocated by Wilderkamp, van Montfoort, and 
van Ruiswijk (1980) in their article ‘Fictionality and Convention’. They criticize prior pragmatic 
approaches to fictionality because these perspectives assume that “the intention(s) of the speaker 
can in principle be known to the hearer” yet in written communication, when readers may not be 
familiar with the discourse-producer, “this is virtually impossible” (p. 550). As an amendment, 
they propose the inclusion of situational conditions of production and reception. 
Klauk and Köppe (2014) and Fludernik (2018) identify and outline that a sociological 
approach also took shape in this period. Fludernik (2018) outlines that such works “analyze 
authors’ license to produce nonfactual accounts which open up a separate realm outside truth and 
lying and link fictionality to diverse practices of diversion and aesthetic recreation” (p. 71). We 
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also see these studies as diachronic since they often conceive of fictionality (both in terms of 
formal aesthetic and epistemological footing) relative to a historical context. In ‘The Rise of 
Fictionality’, Gallagher (2006) focuses on the eighteenth century novel. She argues that 
fictionality developed simultaneously with the rise of the novel and particularly with the 
introduction of novels “about nobody in particular” (Gallagher, 2006, p. 341): paradoxically, 
readers could apparently imagine these nobody-characters as fictional strangers whilst also 
empathizing with them as believably real anybodies. Gallagher’s argument has been rebuffed by 
Fludernik (2018) for conflating fictionality with the trends of a particular genre and period and 
by Phelan (2018) for construing reading fiction primarily as an act of self-development. Whilst 
Zetterberg Gjerlevsen (2016a, 2018) affiliates with the aforementioned rhetorical approach to 
fictionality, her work also takes a diachronic and sociological perspective. She considers 
eighteenth century fiction in English (2016a) and Danish (2018) in order to show the 
understanding of fictionality and its relationship with realism and truth are temporally situated 
and contextual. 
In Five Strands of Fictionality, Punday (2010) explores fictionality in relation to post-
1960s American fiction and culture. In this contemporary context, he argues fictionality is a 
“central condition of culture” (Punday, 2010, p. 25), and its conception is subject to “the 
operation of an institution that legitimizes the creation of invented stories” (2010, p. 15). There 
are therefore coexistent, multiple, overlapping definitions of fictionality. Punday (2010) outlines 
five such definitions or ‘strands’: fictionality understood as myth and folktale; as archive; as lie; 
as style (relative to culture); and as game-play (pp. 27–29). Punday’s approach is thus diachronic 
and sociological in general, though he does make use of Possible Worlds Theory in his analysis 
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of role-playing games (2010, pp. 151–176). In his consideration of several text-types, Punday’s 
work is also implicitly related to transmedial discussions of fictionality. 
Transmediality is itself a recent concept (Klastrup & Tosca, 2004; Jenkins, 2006; Kuhn & 
Thon, 2017). Thus, transmedia narratology – the study of narrative devices across media 
environments – has only recently sought to investigate fictionality. Taking a possible-worlds 
approach, Ryan (2008, p. 388–394) defines transfictionality as a relation between two or more 
texts which contain distinct worlds with readers familiar enough with those worlds to make 
connections between them. Such transfictionality can therefore also be transmedial if the texts 
take different medial forms. Building on Walton’s aforementioned work, Ryan (2006) has also 
sought to augment fictionality into a transmedial concept by developing comparable criteria that 
will cut across semiotic modes and text-types. Similarly, Zipfel (2014) outlines a potential 
transmedial concept of fictionality which he sees as “multilayered” because it includes three 
components: fictional worlds, make-believe games, and institutional practice (p. 105). 
Finally, a cognitive approach appears to be germinating. Indeed, Kukkonen and Nielsen 
(2018) debate the intersections between an unnatural, rhetorical account and a cognitive 
approach, ultimately agreeing that very little scholarship in cognitive narratology has explicitly 
tackled fictionality. Nevertheless, a few relevant studies do exist. In ‘Fictionality and Ontology’, 
Gibbons (2014) takes initial steps towards a cognitive approach, using Text World Theory 
(Werth, 1999; Gavins, 2007) to explore metaleptic crossings in mobile-phone narratives. To 
account for ontological blurs, she draws particularly on Herman’s (2002) account of contextual 
anchoring whereby textual patterns such as “doubly deictic you” cause readers to experience 
analogies between the actual world and the imagined world. Spolsky’s (2015) premise is that 
fictions “are not reliably distinguishable by their surface features from nonfiction, from the rest 
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of the mental and material world in which we live and within which we struggle to keep our 
balance” (p.xiii). Her approach instead seeks to understand fiction as a social contract, that is 
how fiction provides abstract rules that serve communities in mediating with individual and 
social behavior. 
Looking back at the historical development of fictionality studies, a variety of approaches 
are in force. In Table 1, we have sought to bring some clarity to the increasingly burgeoning field 
by categorizing the various contributions in relation to their school of thought or approach.
i
 It 
should be noted: first, that the table is not exhaustive (there are certainly many other scholarly 
meditations of fictionality); and second, that these are fuzzy categories. We have been influenced 
by previous scholars but our categories are not necessarily identical with those of other critics 
(cf. Gorman, 2005; Schaeffer, 2012; Klauk & Köppe, 2014; Zetterberg Gjerlevsen, 2016b; 
Fludernik, 2018). Moreover, the critics listed for each approach do not together form a 
homogenous group: consensus within each school is not wholly absolute. For instance, amongst 
the theorists whom we have grouped as pursuing formalist, text-focused approaches to 
fictionality, there is disagreement as to both the absoluteness and the features of so-called 
‘signposts’. Similarly, within what is labelled as the pragmatic/rhetorical approach, debate 
continues about the narrator and the ‘implied author’ concepts (Booth, 1983): Phelan (2005, p. 
38–49) retains and defends the latter whilst Walsh (2007, p. 82–85) and Nielsen (2010) repudiate 
it. 
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Semantic Syntactic Pragmatic/ 
Rhetorical 
Diachronic/ 
Sociological 
Philosophical Cognitive Transmedial 
Pavel: ‘Possible 
Worlds in Literary 
Semantics (1975), 
Fictional Worlds 
(1998) 
 
Doležel: ‘Narrative 
Semantics’  (1976), 
‘Truth and 
Authenticity in 
Narrative’ (1980), 
‘Mimesis and 
Possible Worlds 
(1988), ‘Possible 
Worlds of Fiction 
and History’ (1998), 
Heterocosmica: 
Fiction and Possible 
Worlds  
Hamburger: The 
Logic of Literature 
(1973) 
 
Banfield: 
Unspeakable 
Sentences (1982) 
 
Lejeune: On 
autobiography (1989 
[1971]) 
 
Cohn: ‘Signposts of 
Fictionality’ (1990), 
The Distinction of 
Fiction (1999) 
 
Genette: ‘Fictional 
Narrative, Factual 
Searle: ‘The Logical 
Status of Fictional 
Discourse’ (1975) 
 
Bruss: 
Autobiographical 
Acts (1976) 
 
Wilderkamp, van 
Montfoort, and van 
Ruiswijk: 
‘Fictionality and 
Convention’ (1980) 
 
 
Walsh: ‘The 
Pragmatics of 
Narrative 
Fictionality’ (2005), 
Gallagher: ‘The Rise 
of Fictionality’ 
(2006), ‘What Would 
Napoleon Do? 
Historical, Fictional, 
and Counterfactual 
Characters’ (2011) 
 
Punday: Five Strands 
of Fictionality (2010) 
 
Zetterberg Gjerlevsen: 
‘A Novel History of 
Fictionality’ (2016), 
‘How to Do Things 
with Fictionality’ 
(2017), ‘The 
Threshold of Fiction’ 
(2018) 
Walton: Mimesis as 
Make-Believe (1990) 
 
Currie: The Nature of 
Fiction (1990), 
Narrative and 
Narrators: A 
Philosophy of Stories 
(2010) 
 
Lamarque and Olsen: 
Truth, Fiction, and 
Literature (1994) 
 
Schaeffer: Why 
Fiction? (2010) 
 
Bareis and Nordrum 
(Eds.) How to Make 
Iser: The Fictive and 
the Imaginary (1993) 
 
Herman: Storytelling 
and the Sciences of 
the Mind (2011) 
 
Gibbons: 
‘Fictionality and 
Ontology’ (2014) 
 
Spolsky: Contracts 
of Fiction (2015) 
 
Kukkonen: [in 
Kukkonen and 
Nielsen] 
‘Fictionality, 
Cognition and 
Ryan: Avatars of 
Story (2006), 
‘Transfictionality 
across Media’ (2008) 
 
Zipfel: ‘Fiction 
across Media’ (2014) 
 
18 
 
(1998) 
 
Ryan: ‘Fiction, Non-
Factuals, and the 
Principle of Minimal 
Departure’ (1980), 
Fictional Worlds, 
Articificial 
Intelligence, and 
Narrative Theory 
(1991) 
 
Lewis: ‘Truth in 
Fiction’ (1983) 
 
Harshaw 
(Hrushovski): 
‘Fictionality and 
Frames of Reference’ 
(1984) 
 
Narrative’ (1990), 
Fiction & Diction 
(1993) 
 
Löschnigg: 
‘Narratological 
Categories and the 
(Non-)Distinction 
between Factual and 
Fictional Narratives’ 
(1999) 
 
Fludernik: ‘Fiction 
vs Non-Fiction’ 
(2001), ‘The Fiction 
of the Rise of 
Fictionality’ (2018) 
 
Hatavara and 
Mildorf: ‘Hybrid 
Fictionality and 
The Rhetoric of 
Fictionality (2007) 
 
Nielsen: ‘Natural 
Authors, Unnatural 
Narration’ (2010), 
‘Unnatural Authors, 
Impersonal Voices, 
Real Author, and 
Non-Communicative 
Narration’ (2011) 
and [in Kukkonen 
and Nielsen] 
‘Fictionality, 
Cognition and 
Exceptionality’ 
(2018) 
 
Nielsen, Phelan, and 
Walsh: ‘Ten Theses 
about Fictionality’ 
Believe (2015) Exceptionality’ 
(2018) 
19 
 
Prince: ‘Narratology, 
Narrative, and 
Meaning’ (1991) 
 
Ronen: Possible 
Worlds in Literary 
Theory (1994) 
 
Bell: ‘Digital 
Fictionality’ (2019) 
Vicarious Narrative 
Experience’ (2017), 
‘Fictionality, 
Narrative Modes, and 
Vicarious 
Storytelling’ (2017) 
(2015) 
 
Phelan: ‘Local 
Fictionality within 
Global Non-Fiction’ 
(2016), ‘Fictionality’ 
(2017), ‘Fictionality, 
Audiences, and 
Character’ (2018) 
 
Zetterberg 
Gjerlevsen: ‘A Novel 
History of 
Fictionality’ (2016), 
‘How to Do Things 
with Fictionality’ 
(2017), ‘The 
Threshold of Fiction’ 
(2018) 
TABLE 1: Approaches to Fictionality 
20 
 
The Fact-Fiction Distinction and Beyond: Factuality, Non-Fictionality, and Fictionalizing 
Strategies 
 
Schaeffer (2012) claims that fiction and factual narratives are “generally defined as a pair of 
opposites” (2012). This assumption underwrites much recent research, which has continued to 
call for the clear separation between fictional literature and other narrative domains and 
methodologies used to study those narratives (see Andersson, 2016, Andersson & Sandberg, 
2018). Greger Anderson and Tommy Sandberg (2018, p. 242) claim the existence and 
dominance of “sameness narratology,” which has the intention to read fictional narratives in the 
same way as non-fictional, everyday narratives. Their polarizing attempt to (re)claim the 
distinctiveness of fiction from all other narrative genres might benefit from what another 
representative of the Örebro approach to narratology, Lars-Åke Skalin, wrote ten years ago: 
“certainly there is something to Hayden White’s [1978, 121] observation: ‘Readers of histories 
and novels can hardly fail to be struck by similarities.’ But similarity is one thing, sameness 
another” (Skalin 2008, p. 226). Skalin’s point is that finding similarities between fictional and 
nonfictional narratives does not actually mean claiming any sameness between them. A more 
fruitful way of approaching the problem may be one that recognizes that for any phenomenon, 
there are cases that are more and cases that are less prototypical. Certainly, Brian McHale (2016) 
has discussed the changes in narrative theory taken place since the fictional novel stopped being 
regarded as the prototypical narrative. He subsequently calls for a multiplicity of narratologies to 
study the multiplicity of narratives, echoing Genette’s criticism of restricted narratology. Both 
fiction as a genre and fictionality as a quality certainly benefit from research that compares 
research methods and results across arts and naturally occurring language uses. 
21 
 
 
Fludernik (2018) - in her summary of ongoing studies of fictionality - makes the point that 
whilst operating under the topic of fictionality, much research is actually concerned with tracing 
what can be called non-fictionality, factuality, or referentiality (p. 70). Zetterberg Gjerlevsen 
(2016b) claims that the first discussion of fictionality that did not link it exclusively to fiction 
(i.e., that also considered non-fiction) is Wildekamp et al. (1980). Within the Nordic Network of 
Narrative Studies in the early 2000s, several scholars clarified the relationships between, for 
example, fictionality and literariness (Grishakova, 2008), fictiveness and fictionality (Bareis, 
2008, p. 156), and two ways of defining fictionality: one in regard to the story content, the other 
in regard to the ways of telling (Hansen, 2005, p. 288). 
Whilst the study of fictionality may have originated as a means of differentiating fiction 
from referentiality, much contemporary research is able to consider non-fictional narratives by 
arguing instead for an understanding of fictionality as a rhetorical resource rather than an 
ontological property. As Zetterberg Gjerlevsen (2016b) explains: 
 
fictionality is not just a term attributed to fictional narratives such as novels and short 
stories; nor is it equated with broad or abstract categories. Rather, fictionality, as a 
fundamental rhetorical mode, is understood as a means to communicate what is invented 
and as such transgresses the boundaries of both fiction and narrative. In this perspective, 
fictionality is not bound to any genre or limited to narrative representation. 
 
This view is particularly aligned with work in the rhetorical tradition previously discussed (e.g., 
Walsh, 2007; Nielsen et al., 2015; Zetterberg Gjerlevsen, 2016a, 2017, 2018). As such, the study 
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of fictionality in relation to non-fiction is often (though not always) enmeshed with the rejection 
of the syntactic approach. Prince, for instance, notes the considerable variance between identified 
signposts of fictionality. Furthermore, he asserts: 
 
...they are never quite conclusive even if their presence constitutes or contributes to a 
“fiction effect.” I could, after all, begin a biography of Napoleon or Richelieu (entirely 
consonant with the truth and written for children or intended to highlight the legendary 
nature of the characters) with "once upon a time”... (Prince, 1991, p. 546.) 
 
In speaking of a “fiction effect”, Prince anticipates more recent debates which revision markers 
or “signposts” of fictionality instead as “fictionalizing strategies” (cf. Iversen & Nielsen, 2016; 
Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017a).  
Lately, studies in fictionality have increasingly sought to account for hybrid texts that seem 
to point to both fictional and referential contexts. Previous examples include Lejeune, who 
positions his characterisation of fiction, autobiography, and what has since become known as 
autofiction as “essentially linguistic and formal” (Lejeune, 1989, p. 130). Simpson (2003) argues 
that satirical discourse is distinct in relation to fictionality, since satirical texts “steer a curious 
path through referentiality and fictionality” (p. 99) and as such appear to possess or signal what 
Simpson coins “referfictionality” (p. 99). He claims that such hybridity distinguishes satire from 
other forms of fictional writing, precisely because it “attaches a kind of ‘insincerity’ to its 
manner of delivery’. The textual strategies of satire, in other words, undercut the truth-claims 
made therein. (Simpson, 2003, pp. 99, 167.) Recognising the satirical intent of the text, therefore, 
entails complex text-processing strategies: “a real anterior discourse event” (p. 9) must be primed 
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by the text and then recognised through recourse to general or text-external knowledge whilst 
internal textual features open up a dialectical mismatch between that real discourse and the 
satirical text. It is in this way, Simpson argues, that satire produces its paradoxical 
referfictionality, at once signalling that its truth claims are appropriate as well as insincere.  
Mari Hatavara and Jarmila Mildorf (2017a) focus on “fictionalizing strategies” or, in their 
words, “narrative techniques associated with fictionality” (p. 67) that can be found in non-fiction. 
Their analyses of such hybrid texts leads Hatavara and Mildorf (2017b) to introduced the term 
“cross-fictionality”, which they define as “instances of storytelling where the contextual frame 
clearly marks the story and its narrative environment as nonfictional but where narrative 
techniques typically found in generic fiction still occur” (p. 405). Cross-fictionality attempts to 
bring fictionality studies together with narratology and textual analysis instead of speculating on 
authorial intentions or focusing on the referentiality of story content. As such, their approach is 
in line with, and develops from, Dorrit Cohn’s early narratological attempts to locate signposts of 
fictionality. Their work also draws inspiration from important studies in forms like free indirect 
discourse, finding the form not exceptional to fiction but characteristic of it (see McHale 1978, 
pp. 282–283). The textual signposts of fictionality focus on mind representation, which appears 
to feature prominently in cases of narratives of vicarious experience, where someone tells what 
someone else has experienced. 
 
 
Overview of volume 
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The long history of fictionality studies in narratology provides a useful basis on which to 
investigate the post-truth forms of story-telling outlined at the beginning of this introduction. 
Whilst we have sought to provide a historically grounded overview of the field, taken together 
the articles in this special issue also contribute to, complicate, and advance the study of 
fictionality. Questions raised include different approaches to fictionality together with questions 
of truthiness, authorial intention, readerly interpretation as well as textual and contextual features 
of fictionality and factuality. 
In their contribution to the special issue, Kim Schoofs and Dorien Van De Mieroop address 
the question of “truth” and authorial intention by analyzing repeated WWII-testimonies by two 
Belgian concentration camp survivors. With the use of an interactional-sociolinguistic approach 
and the theory of master narratives, Schoofs and Van De Mieroop demonstrate the relativity of 
what is presented as the “truth” in different temporal and spatial contexts. Their data showcases 
the importance of the social storytelling context in guiding narrative as social action and 
affecting what is considered true, relevant, and worth narrating. Schoofs and Van De Mieroop 
show the interlinkage between the narrators’ identity work and their spatio-temporally changing 
narratives and discuss how this undermines the possibility of determining whether the narrators 
possess intentionality over the fictionality/factuality of their narratives and whether they know 
that certain events are facts and others are not. 
Jessica Mason is similarly interested in the relationship between intentionality and 
fictionality. She explores ‘false flag’ narratives produced to offer a counter version of an existing 
narrative. As conspiracy theories, false flag narratives by their very nature offer alternative 
versions of narratives commonly held as nonfictive. Mason argues they thus blur the boundaries 
between fiction and non-fiction, containing elements of both fictive and nonfictive discourse. 
25 
 
Her cognitive, figure-ground analysis highlights how, by re-distributing attention and using 
fictional narrative modes, false flag narratives construct fiction out of facts. Like Schoofs and 
Van De Mieroop, Mason’s findings problematize the notion of using an assessment of authorial 
intention in determining the status of a text as fictional or not, since authors may not know what 
they believe or may be conflicted about it. Therefore, separating fictive discourse from 
phenomena like lying proves impossible. 
 In his investigation into the interpretative practices of members of the antifeminist 
“manosphere”, Nurminen outlines the manner in which the participants in this online community 
co-opt canonical literary works. Following Fetterley (1978) and Felski (2008), he suggests that 
they employ an inverted form of ‘resistant reading’ in which they ‘recognise’ or downplay 
narrative features of canonical novels, constructing a reading of these works which accords with 
their own misogynistic ideological perspective, and enacting a shared online identity as they do 
so. Nurminen links these interpretative practices to the post-truth concept of ‘careless speech’ 
(Hyvönen, 2018), coining the term ‘careless interpretation’. The article therefore explores the 
uses of fiction in building an online community in the service of advancing an antifeminist 
ideological agenda.               
Browse and Hatavara’s contribution to this special issue considers the complex fictionality 
involved in satire through an examination of political journalism. Focusing on the satirical 
representation of mind style, their analysis is underwritten by the argument that representing and 
reading the minds of others entails the transgression of both a fictionality/ontological boundary 
as well as an epistemic boundary. Satire – Browse and Hatavara argue – is by nature cross-
fictional in that whilst it is invented for rhetorical effect, it necessarily relies on an intimation of 
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truthfulness. Ultimately, Browse and Hatavara advocate cross-fictionality as a nuanced analytical 
category that can account for the real-world effect of fictionalized representations. 
 Rather than fictionality, Bjorninen instead considers the ways in which factuality is 
rhetorically constructed in the fraudulent feature journalism of the journalist, Class Relotius. 
Taking influence from Fludernik (1996, 2000) and Walsh (2007), he sets out a rhetorical and 
hermeneutic approach to factuality, defining it as a generic frame which structures our 
interpretation of textual features. The discourse modes involved in this frame all usually entail 
appealing to a factual authority. He defines four such authorities – referential, institutional, 
experiential and speculative – and employs this framework to analyse an article by Relotius, 
pointing to the interplay between generic frame, the genre conventions of feature journalism, and 
the discourse modes used in the text which produces the effect of factuality.                
Maria Laakso investigates Alan Weisman’s The World Without Us, a (global) non-fiction 
text that imagines the future after climate change has made humans extinct. Like Björninen, 
Laakso’s approach follows the rhetorical tradition. As such, she considers Weisman’s signaled 
use of fictional and factual rhetorical strategies: hypothetical futures and thought-experiments on 
the one hand; scientific evidence and expert interviews, on the other hand. It is precisely this 
combination of fictional and non-fictional rhetoric that – Laakso argues – gives The World 
Without Us its affective and ideological force. 
Like Jessica Mason, and to some extent also Sam Browse and Mari Hatavara, Alison 
Gibbons formulates a cognitive approach to fictionality. Drawing on Text World Theory and 
mind-modelling, Gibbons analyses Elena Ferrante’s Neapolitan Quartet, a series of novels that – 
although fictional – critics and readers often interpret as autobiographical or autofictional. 
Gibbons initially studies the textual style of Ferrante’s novels in order to assess whether there are 
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explicit signposts of fictionality or of autobiography. Subsequently, she explores how features 
and themes of the novels, as well as extratextual knowledge, are used by readers to build a mind-
model of the author through which they can deduce intentionality as to the fictionality of the 
work. However, as Gibbons argues, Ferrante’s pseudonymic identity complicates access to 
authorial intention and thus thwarts judgments of fictionality. As such, Gibbons concludes that 
fictionality should be considered as a cognitive attribute that readers bring to the literary 
experience. 
The final article in this special issue, by Elise Kraatila, analyses Kazuo Ishiguro’s (2015) 
fantasy novel The Buried Giant as an exemplar of speculative fiction. As Kraatila outlines, 
Ishiguro’s novel is set in a conspicuously fabricated world and utilizes thought experiments. 
These two techniques of fictionality are crucial for allowing readers to come to terms with the 
post-truth world. More specifically, Kraatila advocates the power and importance of fantasy as a 
genre and speculative storytelling as a narrative mode in equipping readers and audiences with 
critical tools with which to examine the various realities at work in the post-truth world. 
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